FreeBSD was one of the first widely deployed free operating systems to provide mandatory access control. It supports a number of classic MAC models. This tutorial paper addresses exploiting this implementation to enforce typical enterprise security policies of varying complexities.
security class. This makes these documents available for further processing to the higher levels of hierarchy: for example, they may be included into Jane's or Paul's reports for John. In FreeBSD, the MAC labels are assigned to the user accounts via the notion of login classes. The mapping of user accounts to their login classes is given in the master.passwd file, where the user accounts are traditionally stored. The login classes are listed alongside the group information. The login classes themselves are specified in the login.conf file. In the examples, we will list only the MAC-related configuration of the login classes. The MAC labels used in FreeBSD have the syntax of policy1/qualifier1,policy2/qualifier2,..., where the policy component describes the policy module (e.g., Biba or MLS), and the qualifier describes a corresponding grade, compartments, and a combined grade-compartment range [8] . In the following sections the increasingly complex information flow control goals are considered. The goals are then translated into a MAC policy sufficient to fulfill them, and then into a FreeBSD implementation.
III. PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY
Suppose that the organization needs to protect itself from making decisions based on the untrusted data. That is, John should not make decisions based on the data directly received from Alice or Robert. This corresponds to the John's subject (which is his user login) having a higher integrity label: he should be prevented from inadvertently reading a document of the lower integrity label than his own. Also, John's requests should propagate through the organization unchanged: his documents cannot be tampered with by the subjects with a lower integrity. In the information flow sense, the information is allowed to flow from the higher integrity to the lower integrity objects, but the reverse flow is disallowed. This is the Biba model with the liberal ⋆-property [6] . It is directly supported in FreeBSD by the mac biba module. The assignment of the labels to the files in the case of the Biba model support will look like shown in Table II , and the user label assignment is shown in Table V . The Temp folder is excluded from the policy by setting its grade to equal, because it serves as a document exchange location.
While the Biba policy enforces the integrity, it also disallows the reverse flow of information. It is obvious that the management should be aware of what is going on in the managed departments, so the reverse flow is required for the considered example. This is achievable in FreeBSD by adding ranged labels. The ranged labels allow the subjects to change both their grade and compartment within some range: the grade in the numeric one and the compartment in the set one. The syntax of these labels is biba/effectivegrade:effectivecompartments(lograde:locompartments-higrade:hicompartments). If John's subject were assigned the biba/10(10-10) label, there would be no way for him to access the document labeled biba/2. But if the subject's label were biba/10(2-10), he would be able to downgrade it to the necessary grade of 2 to read the document. For the case of the considered example, this situation is avoided. Instead, we use the notion of a trusted entity. This entity is a subject that can promote the document integrity grade, and is trusted by the higher integrity subject. In our example, this subject's user should be able to verify the documents submitted by the subjects with the lower integrity, and if possible and needed, to promote the document integrity grade. Jane and Paul are assigned these privilege and responsibility, and are assigned the label of biba/5(2-10). Thus, Jane can downgrade her integrity grade to 2 to read Mary's report, decide that it can be trusted and is worth for John to see, and then copy it to John while promoting its integrity grade to 10. This is achievable by the following sequence of actions:
• Mary creates a Report1 file in the UAccountingReports folder.
• She moves the file to the Temp folder.
• Jane's current integrity label is biba/5(2-10). She downgrades it to biba/2 using a command like setpmac biba/2 sh, and copies the Report1 file to her home folder. The ownership of the document's copy belongs to Jane.
• Now Jane can read the report and check it for mistakes or forged data.
• After she decides that the document can be forwarded to John, she changes its integrity label to biba/10 by using the setfmac biba/10 Report1 command. She then promotes her own clearance to biba/10 as well, and moves the document to the SummarySalesReports folder. That folder has the integrity label of biba/10 and is accessible to John.
• Now John can read the document. The described policy protects the integrity of the data, and makes sure that the top management decisions are not affected by any unverified data. We proceed by adding the confidentiality to the organization's information security goals.
IV. ADDING CONFIDENTIALITY LEVELS
As the company we consider is a technology one, it is rather possible that it generates the intellectual property (IP). The Engineering department (in our case, Paul and Robert) generates the company's IP. John should have access to it, while Jane and her team should not. However, John may have access to the more confidential information than Paul. For example, he may be working with the company's partners on the subject of a common patent or elaborating a shared strategic technology plan. Also, not only should the confidential documents be kept away from the persons with the lower clearance levels, but the persons with the higher clearance levels should be prevented from disclosing the confidential information they know, either knowingly or inadvertently. The policy to govern this kind of information flow may look like the following:
•
, with the latter one assigned to Jane and her team. The Bell-LaPadula model is supported by the FreeBSD mac mls module (further referred to as MLS).
Also, it is still required to preserve the integrity, and do not loose the work done in the previous section. FreeBSD allows this by providing the capability of running multiple MAC policy modules simultaneously. Thus, it is possible for the Biba and the Bell-LaPadula policies to be in effect at the same time, and to preserve both integrity and confidentiality.
For the FreeBSD implementation, we map the Secret clearance to the grade of 100, Confidential to 50, and Public to low. The updated file labels are shown in Table III , and the user labels are shown in Table VI .
Compare the user labels assignment for the Biba and the Bell-LaPadula policies. There are two new user logins for the BellLaPadula model: John.Sales and John.Engineering. As per the confidentiality configuration, while being in the CEO position, John cannot directly publish the information for the Sales and the Engineering, for his clearance level is the highest one. By logging in as the lower clearance subject, John will be unable to access his documents, and this will prevent him from inadvertently (or any malicious software on his computer from knowingly) disclosing secret and confidential information to the lower clearance subjects.
V. SPLITTING THE COMPETENCE AREAS
Jane has the aggregate data of the sales activity of the company. While the data of every individual salesperson cannot give the whole picture, the aggregate reveals the current state of the company sales. Thus, it might be desirable to classify the aggregate information as Confidential. In the considered example, simply adding an MLS grade would not help, because the MLS grades are totally ordered, and the new labels will conflict with the Engineering department: either the engineers will be able to read the Sales' documents, or vice versa (this depends on whose grade is higher). In other words, the Sales and the Engineering should have their own hierarchies with a single point of intersection: John should have access to the documents of both departments. This corresponds to the set-based domination relation: for two sets S 1 and S 2 , S 1 dominates S 2 (further written as S 1 ≻ S 2 ) iff S 2 ⊂ S 1 . Obviously, incomparable labels are supported by this definition: {1, 2, 3} ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 5}, but {5, 9} and {5, 6, 7} are incomparable. In the considered example, three labels are sufficient: S Sales = {1}, S Eng = {2}, and S = {1, 2}, where label S belongs to John, so that he can access documents belonging to any of the departments: S ≻ S Sales and S ≻ S Eng .
FreeBSD supports the set-based domination relation by the notion of compartments. Compartments are the sets of integers, which can be added to the Biba or the MLS labels. In the example, the labels are directly mapped to the compartments. The MLS parts of the labels may be rearranged, as they are not used for distinguishing the Engineering and the Sales any longer. Instead, the MLS grades set the confidentiality grades within individual compartments. The resulting folder and user labels are shown in Tables IV and VII, respectively. The John.Sales and John.Engineering logins are removed, while a new one is added: John.Lower. This new login has the same MLS grade as Jane's and Paul's ones, and is used for creating the documents with their confidentiality classification.
With these settings, John is the only person who accesses the secret information. All other users have access to the confidential information, and none of them deals with creating publicly accessible documents. John has access to both compartments. While it is possible for him to disclose the information of one compartment to another one, this will not violate the confidentiality grades, and John is considered a trusted entity for managing the inter-department information flows.
VI. THE CHINESE WALL POLICY
The Chinese Wall policy first formalized by Brewer and Nash [10] is oriented toward the commercial sector. This policy provides for prevention of information flows, which cause conflicts of interest for individual consultants working for the same consulting company. As soon as a consultant has obtained access to the confidential information of a client company, he or she must have their access rights to all other companies from this industry sector revoked. However, the consultant must still have access to the public information of all client companies. The consultant starts with the access rights to all information of all client companies. As soon as the consultant accesses the information of a company C from an industry I, he is then denied access to the confidential information of all other companies from the industry I. However, the consultant's access to any information of any company from other industries is allowed. Thus, the conflict of interest does not take place. The deficiencies and important enhancements of the original Chinese Wall policy model are described by Sandhu in [11] . In the same paper, the author demonstrates that the enhanced Chinese Wall policy can be represented in the Bell-LaPadula model, and is therefore a lattice-based policy. While discussing a possible implementation of this policy on FreeBSD, we will follow the definitions given in [6] .
There is a dominance relation for these labels defined as follows: Fig. 2 . It is important to understand how the lattice structure is completed by defining the class-combining join operator ⊕. Two labels l 1 and l 2 are called compatible if ∀k ∈ 1, N :
This also means that all comparable labels are compatible, but there are incomparable labels which are compatible, like [1, ⊥, 2] and [⊥, 3, 2] . Incompatible labels cannot be combined, while for compatible labels the following rule exists:
. We will denote the labels l 1 and l 2 as being compatible byĈ(l 1 , l 2 ). Understanding this definition will be required during feasibility analysis for the FreeBSD implementation of the policy.
As a user progresses upwards the domination relation over the lattice, his rights become more and more restrictive. The user leaves a trail of subjects during this progress. For example, for user Mary, the access to public information is granted to the subject "Mary". As soon as Mary starts working on a project with a bank A, a new subject "Mary.Banks.A" is created for her. When she starts working on a project with an oil company B, another subject is created for her: "Mary.Banks.A.Oil.B". While in a session with "Mary.Banks.A.Oil.B" subject, Mary can read the public documents from the banking and oil industries, but cannot write to them. To write to the public documents for the oil industry, she has to close her current session and initiate a new one with the subject "Mary".
The assignment of the user names may be assumed to be performed manually (for example, by a system administrator). The FreeBSD implementation of the Chinese Wall policy is based on this fact. All possible login classes should be created in advance, so that adding a new user will not lead to rebuilding the login classes. The set of login classes required is (C + 1) N , and one of those classes is a public one. The number of compartments required is C × N . The FreeBSD MAC implementation imposes a limit on the number of compartments: it should be lower than 256. This limitation should be taken into account when checking a specific organization Chinese Wall policy for feasibility. To prevent the user from applying the dominance relation to the classes dominated according to the compartment set inclusion relation, MLS labels are added. The number of MLS grades should be N + 1 (taking into account the public one, and with the exception of the SYSHIGH class).
The rule for labeling the login classes on FreeBSD closely follows the ⊕ operator considered earlier in this section. The labeling algorithm is shown in Fig. 3 . As a result of applying this algorithm to the original lattice, a set of triplets is constructed. A triplet contains an MLS grade, a FreeBSD compartments set, and a corresponding original Chinese Wall label. The algorithm iterates over the lattice by examining the set of labels with a fixed non-⊥ set of positions on every step. The system administrator has to create a set of login classes for the combined Bell-LaPadula and compartment labels. When a user starts working with a company from a new industry, the administrator provides the user name corresponding to the changed Chinese Wall lattice label.
VII. CONCLUSION
The set of the policies implemented by the FreeBSD/TrustedBSD project allows to implement not only the Bell-LaPadula and Biba models. By reusing the result of the Chinese Wall model being a lattice-based one, it can be implemented in the FreeBSD MAC framework as well. Also, the level of MAC support allows implementing trusted entities, so that the information flows are possible both ways, but in a controllable manner, so that the policies are not violated. The combination of a number of MAC models provides a very flexible platform for satisfying the needs of various organizations. The authors hope that the proper illustration of FreeBSD MAC support capabilities will promote the usage of mandatory access control in the commercial sector.
